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IN THE SUPREME COU·RT

of the
STATE OF UTAH

EDITH M.

i.~i:\"':.\"OLOIS,

Plainii f.f ·and Appellant,
-vs.NOR~fAN ~r

.

ltFa~JS,

Defe-ndant wnd Respondent.

J STRODl}CTOR\~

S·TArr~~~·1ENT

This is an appeal fro1n the District Court of Salt
Lake Cormty in \vhich a jury returned a verdict in favor

of the defendant in a suit brought

b~y-

plaintiff for dam-

ages for personal injuries suffered \vhcn she "\vas struck
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by the defendant\~_ autotnohilc as she \Va~ e.rossing State

Rtreet at a point a little more than 20 fel~t south of First
. AVt~nue in Salt Lake City.

The parties \vill be designated as they appeared in
t.he trial court.
'"Phe stHterriL~nt of faG1~ in plaintiff's brief is not

accepted by the defendant and should not be favorably

con Ridered by this Court in view of the rule reiterated
In lley1tolds 1J. W. lJ7 • Clyde & Co4 (Utah, 1956)~ 298 P. 2d

531:
-~

t'Plaintiff presents her case on appeal by
reciting facts tending most favorably to prove her
claiirt. The opposite approach must be adopted,
and it hardly bears repeating that in a case like
this the factual gituation will be reviewed on
appeal in a light most favorable to the party prevail i ng be] 0\11.-' .''

Defendant presentf.;, in the folloVl-wg statement of
fa-cts, the evidence the jury reasonably could have be-.
lieved and the inferences and intendn1ent~ ,,-hif".h the jury
could have fairly dra\vn therefron1, in arriving at it5
verdict. in~ Re Richard's Estate. (Utah, 195(1), 297 P. 2d
5424

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

3

State Street is a notth-~outh street, 42 feet 'vidt~ .
.lnunediately north of the sr.Pne of this ac.ci dent, First
A.venue, running do\\rnhi ll from the east, ends at State
Street, forrning a 90 degree angle (Ex. 1).
The only marked pedestrian cro:-:;s\valk crossing State

Street was on the north side of the intersection. A half
a bloek to the nortlt and a half a block to t.hc. south at
North Temple Street and South Temple Street, there
Vt;rere n1arkcd pcdcst rian eross\valks and stop and go traffic lightf.! \Vere in operation {R. 54, 55) .
At about 4:30

p~m . ,

11artlt 25, 1958, defendant

wa~

driving to "tvork in his automobile, and after· stopping at
the stop sign controlling the ent:r~y- of ~'estbound Lrafr[c

fro1n

·wir~t

Avenue into State St rcct, he tnade a left turn

to go south on State Street (R. 3H).
Plaintiff, then age 84, had \Valked fTOln the
~l,elnple

L~

D.

S~

through the bloek and behind the c·hureh offices.

She ernerged from an alley onto the side"\valk on the
\\-~est

side of State Street, at a point directly

the end of First Avenue (ft

69~

Ex.

2)~

oppo~itG

Although the

mar ked pedestrian crosswalk \vas then but a f cv·.r steps
north~ and 8l1e krle\ov it ~Tas there, she chose to turn
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south ("1~. 69). Se lived at 28 ~ orth State Street)' 1vhieh
\VH~ Houtheast or the point ,vhere she entered State

Street

{r~x4

1).

Plaintiff began to cross the Htreet at a point south of
the telephone pole visible in the photograph, "ll~xhibit 2.
The point of hnpaet i ~ 11 ot visible in the photograph~
~ince it "\\'as plaeed, as "\vill be seen, more than 20 feet
~outh of the First _._.\venue curb liner
~I·here

were no

\Vhit'-~

IJCde~t.t·ian C.J'OSS\va}k

lines or other indications of a

\Vhere plaintiff was

"\\'"a1h::ing~

al-

though each of the other tVt'O crof.1sings at the intersection
\Vere

elea:rly lined as
v,.~as

·There

crosE·n~~alks

(Ex. 2).

a wet sno"\v falling, which was described

by the investigating traffic officer af.; the kind that slides
do\vn the car and melts on the street, leaving the street
v.ret, but \vithout a snow cover

·l,,. j p

(R·~

23).

Defendant~s

'C1 e an ed the sn 0'\'- from the 'vind~hield so that he could see ahead of his car although
ll1~ side 'vindo\vs were fogged up (R·. 24-, 3~).
\vindsh l c l d

P rs

Just a.s defendant was "conring out of the i.urnn
(R~

B7) and as lu: \vas loolring ahead through the wind-

~hield, he

saw the plaintiff, who vlas then about 3 or 4

fpet into State Street from the \Ve~t curb . She "'aS \valk-
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ing in a generally eastern direction, holding a ne1vspaper
~jver her head to sh·ield her head fron1 the sno\v storm.
Aecording to the po1ice officer, defendant, at one
thne, said l1e "W as 30 or 40 feet a\vay froJn her ~;Ju~n he
first sa\,.' her (R. 17)4 He also told the offieer he 1vas
'i3 to 4 feef~ a\vay (R~ 2-5 )4 He \-vas upset at that thne
(R. ~5) ~ TllL~ officer discounted his state1nent, in vie'v
of the other phy~ical fac·t~ (R.4 2-fi-28) ~
7

At trial 1 defendant. marked the map 1vith a srnall
~·x'' to shovl where }Hj bel icved h1 s ear \\ US "\~lhen he first
sa'\' plaintiff in the street (Ex. 1~ :1t.• :J7, 39). L"si.ng th~
s-cale of the map, l1e Vt'as then about 18 to 2~ feet north
0 r the eventual point of lin pact and plain tiff '~;as then
10 to 11 feet from that point.
7

Defendant \Vas traveling at a 8peed of bet\veen 1.0
and 1~1 miles .an hour, in a generally southern direction.
Hr immediately applied his brakes to Rtop the automobile
beC.R!JSC pia~ nt i ['f' COntinued to \Valk direr.tly into the path
of h1~ car ( r-t. 52)4
He had alrnost. stopped at the ti1ne of impact (R. 53).
Plainti.ff ·\\·as knocked du\vn~ Defendant fo11nd her on
the ~treet in1n1ediatel~y in front of the car, with her head
facing to the south.. Plaintiff suffered bruises, a Inomentary lapse of. eonsciousness, and a cracked ankle bone
(R. 4fl, 67)

4

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

fi

Plaintiff aduritted at thP trial Utat she did not look
for traffic after she started ac.rn~s ·the street and she
r1evcr t:la\v the antornobile that struck her (R. 5D~ 68).
·rhi~ \vas {~01TOborated by defendant's testimony in \Vhic.h
he stated that frorn the titnc he first saw her, \vhen she
was about 3 or 4_ feet into the street l'rom the ruth,
plaintiff never turned her head to look, had the news~
papet· (lVCr her head to shield her head from the snov,\
kept. \valklng in the sau1e Inanner and 'vithout reducing
speed until she reaehed a point directly in the path or
his a11tomohile (R.. 52, 53).
rl,he investigating police officer arrived at the scene
4 Tniuutes after being called and found tl1e plaintiff being
assisted onto a stretcher lJ.V an arnbulance police officer
1vho had ar-l"ivcd earlier~ ·.Plaintiff \vas 24 feet south of
the soul.h c.u r b line of -~,i rst A venue and defendant~s car
\\ras 1 foot nort.h of he:r. rPhere 'vere no skid marks and
no marks upon defendant's automobile. There v,.~as no
indi.r_ati.on that the ear had dragged plaintiff along the
street and from an investigation of all the circumstances,
the offic.er toncluded that the probable point of impart
~~give or take a foot or t\vo~' 'vas about 23 feet south of
the south curb line of First A venue~ and in the traffic
lane closest to the center line, at a point 14 feet into
t l u_~ s trePt from the v{est curb (RL 22, 23, 27) ~

Upon this state of the record, the trial court in8t.ructed the jury that plaintiff \Yf:ts negligent as a matter
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of la"\\T in atterrtpting to cross the

~J.reet. V~t~here

she did in

vie\v of the prohibition found in Section 41-G-79 (c), Utah
(~ode

Annotated, 1953, v,:rhich

reads~

"Between adjacent intersections at whieh
traffic control signals are in operation, pedestrians shall not cross at any place except in a
ntarked

cross-w·alk~" (R-~

109).

Although not so requested by the defendant, the

here plain tiff
attempted to cross \\1as not an "unmarkerl c.ross-vralk at
an in terseetion,'' as that tern1 is used in Section 41-t1-79
(a), and by reason thereof plaintiff \Vas required to
yield the right-of-\\'ay to the defendant's automobile if
it \vas so near as to constitute an im1nc dia te hazard to
court alRo told the jury that the place

\V

her (R·. 110).

The court also submitted to the jury the issues of
"\\'"hether plaintiff's conduct 1~tas an effectiv~e con trihu ting
cause to her injuries, whether defendant was negligent
in any one of four particulars, and, if so, -v.,;het.her his
negligenee

~~a~

a proximate cause and, finally, upon

plaintiff's request (R~ 94), the issue of 1vhether the
defendant should be found liable under the humanitarian
doctrinP. of last clear

rllance~
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T}le jury returned a verdict in favor of the defend-

ant and against the }Jlaintiff, no cause of action (R. 82).

There.after a ntotion for ne\\T tr·1al

\Vas

scasonab]y f11ed,

argued and denied. This appeal follo\ved .
STATE::\fENT OF POINTS
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY INSTRUCTED THE

JURY UNDER SECTION 41-6-79 (c)t UTAH CODE ANNOTATED,

1953~

THAT PLAINTIFF WAS NEGLIGENT IN

ATTEMPTING TO CROSS THE STREET WHERE SHE DID.

POINT II
ANY ERROR WHICH THE TRIAL COURT MAY HAVE

C01iMITTED WAS HARMLESS AND NOT PREJUDICIAL
SINCE PLAINTIFF, BECAUSE OF HER NEGLIGENCEt WAS
NOT ENTITLED TO A VERDICT IN ANY EVENT .

...~RGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY INSTRUCTED THE
JURY UNDER SECTION

41~6-79 (c),

UTAH CODE ANNO-

TATED, 1953J THAT PLAINTIFF WAS NEGLIGENT IN
A TTEIVIPTING TO CROSS THE STREET WHERE SHE DID.
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To aid the ·Court in understandi11g fully the ba~is of
t hc trial eourt 'R ruling that plaintiff \vas n egiigen t, "\\;re
shall analy~e and at tr.rupt t.o determine the pu.rpose and
meaning of the statutor-y provisions upon 1rvhich the
ruling 'vas based.

The stat.nt.P involved is Section 41-6-79, 1Jtah Code
Annotated~ 1953, the pP.rtinent sub~ser.tions of \vhirh read
as follo1rvs :
'~(a)

Every pedestrian crossing a road'\\}'ay

at any point othP.r than within a marked cross~
walk or v.;rithin an unrnarked crosswalk at. an intersection shall yield the right-of~ V{ay to all vehicles
upon the road1vay . ''
" (c) Between adjacent intersections at
"'hich traf fie control signal~ are in operation pedestriB.Jls sha.ll 'Ytot cross at any plac.e except in a
marked crosswalk~ 1' ( liJrnphasis added.)

The next preceding statutory section rcq uircs the
driver of a vehi(!le to yield the ri.ght-of~\vay to a pede~
trian crost5ing the road,,.,ray \vith.in a eross\valk, 'vith
certain exceptions 'vhieh arP tJnlrntterial here.
These three provjsions of the statutes provide the
basic law governing the relative rights and duties of
pedestriant5 and automobile drivers at points 'vhich arc
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not gove1ned hy traffic contrDl 8ignals. The difference
in language utilized in tl1ese seetions i~ f.;ignifjc.ant and
should be recognized h}· thiR (~ourt Three situations
seem to he eontc1nplated by these ~er.t.!ons of the la"\v:

First. If a pedestrjan i~ v{ithin a crossv.-alk,. the
aut.o1nobile dri.ver must yield the rigltt-of-way to the
pedest.r1an, except jn situation~ not pertinent here.

Second. It is recognized that a pedestrian may have
the right to cross a street at a point other than within
a crossv.ralk but if he docs so, he rnust yield the right-of~
1vay to an on-eorning automobile.

Third. In certain areas, involving situations clifferent frotn either of those just discussed, a pedestrian
is prohibited from crossing the street at any place except
in a rna-rked cross\vallc
Sub~section

(e) of Section 41-6-79, 'vhieh prohibits
a pedef.;trian fron1 crossing tlte street at other than designated points, is absolute and positive in its language and
obviously \v.a~ pa~sed v..,.hen earlier, less definite la\rS,
failed to provide protection against. the dangers of
rnodern traffic flo\'{ in busy dov..-iltO"W'll areas.

The history of the legislation seems to furnish support to this interpretat.ion. _A_s revealed by Compiled
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La,~...-s

of Ctah~ 1917, the fir~ t statutory provisions rela ting to lllotor vehicles and operatots covered less than
five pages in tl1e codG, and all la\V8 relating to motor
veh iele~, their registration, licensing, equip1nent and "\\~hat
1vere styled as ~'rules of the road" Vt'ere encon1passed in
but t\ver1t.y sections of the code. The 'vord ''pedeRtrian~'
\VaS apparently then lillkllOV.lll in the ron text of tra r"fic
regulation and control.
The first la-v{ directed at eon trolling pedestrian crossing of highvla~ys is found in the 1921 . -\1nendrnent
.
to
Section 3985 of Compiled La,vs of l~tah, 1917. The law,
a~ amended, prohibited crossing of a high\vay ~~except at
a regular crossing thereof, provided such crost5ing is
\\~ithin three hundred feet of another regular crossing on
the same .high,~ray ... ''
This v.·as the first attempt to prevent pede~tria.ns
frum appearing upon traveled road,vays at unex1iect.ea
places~ It \:ra~ obviously an att.ernpt to emphasize to an
unsuspecting public the dangcr8 inherent in the automo~
bile age.

The first comprehensive st.atute regulating t.raffic on
highways "\\ as enacted by the 1egislature as Chapter 49,
Laws of l~tah, 1931. This statute, entitled ""Unifol'nt Act
Regulating Traffic on Highwa~ys '' carried fonvard the
idea that pedestrians should use cross~~alks in crossing
7

a road"'"ay, that if they crossed at pointE; ot.her than in
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cross~'alks

they wrere required to yield the right-of-\ray
and, finally, a::1 to certain areas, pedef-;trians "\vere pro~
hibited from erosslng the road1rvay at alL
ln Section 39 of that act, local author11 ies were given
p o1rver to require by ordinance that '~.. . . at intersections
''rher.-e traffic. is controlled by traffic control signals or
hy police offic.ers, IJedel:1trians shall not cross a roadway
again~t. a red or 'stopt signal, and between adjace-nt inter~ectionr.; so controlled -Rhall not cross at any plar,e except
in a marked or unmarked crosswalk.''
~phis

provision, giving local authorities the option to
prohibit eertain crossing attempts, was apparently :found
inadequate by the legislature in view of the ever-increasing number of automobiles upon the highway. Thus, in
1941, the legislature found it necessary to enlarge the
Lrniforn1 Act R.egulating Traffic on Highways and for
the first tirne, under Section 66 of Chapter 52, La\vs of
lJ tah, 1941 ~ nut).. be found the provj si on, effective
throughout the State regardless of the ae.t of local
authorities, that pedestrians shall not cross at any place
except in a marked cross,valk

,:~between

adjacent inter-

sections at '\vhich traffic control signals are in operation.''

This development of the law reveals a continuing
attempt by the legislature to cope 1Vith the mounting
dangers and comple-xities of modern traffic. Obviously
. .,.
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the l~·g-1 ~latun_~ found that leaving an option to local traffic control to }Jrotect perlestrjan~ in busy arr:as 1vas insnfficient. It 'vas determined that there should be stat e"\vid c
p t·ot(_~e.L] nn for pedestrians ft.nd n1otorists alike in con~
hc\sted arcas 1 suc.h as do·\~,nttov'";n bu~iness districts, and
that pedestrians should have r-un ple opportunity to cro8s
a strePt but only "\vith the protection of traffie signals
or· rna1'kefl rross\vallu-~. Butt hPeau8e traffic in ~ueh areas
is so heavy and so con Rtan t and th~ danger of accidents
is, tl1eref"orc, ~o great~ t.he legi~latnre fonnd it necessary
to prohibit erot:1s ing at other than speci fi ed areas ~-- ~ 11
other ~'ords, to prohibit ~~jay 1A'alking. ~'
Thus, a pedestrian standing on the ~outh side of
~econd South Street bet-\vPen ~fa in anrl State Streets, i::;
not allo\\'ed to crosf.; to the north across Sernod Soulh
Street. to Regent Street except by the us0 of" the only
marked pedestrian e.ross,valk, \vhich is found on the ea.~t
Rirlc of the inte r~ettion as an ex ten~ ion of the Regent
Street ~idc\\~alk. )lotorists are entitled to asR11n1e, and

do assl1lriP 1 that pedestrians \vill not bG found in any
other area of Second South bet\\'een .\1 ain and Slate
Streets except in thr. 1narked cross\valk or at

tions

~'liere

traffic eontro1

As is "\vell
are

man~i

lrnO"\\'ll

~ignal~

interser~

are in operation.

to all \vho 1ivc in this Cit.y2 there

more instanees in the do,vntoVt:n area -.,vhere

similar "T'' intersections are found. They are found on
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~tate Street, ln:~t,veen South Teu1ple and First South
NtTeet~

and bet:\veen ]"1irst and Second South Street
~;\_long South rremple Street~ opposite tlte Templ~
grounds~ is anotlu.~r, forn1ed by the Richardf.; Street intersection and another itJ one block to the south . Others are
located on \\Test Tern Dle Street, .!\fain Street and Fourth
South Street.

each of thege, there is but one marked crosswalk
'':hich pedestrians 1nay use and each such area~ like the
area jilVolved in this ease, is clearly vlithin the eonteinplation of Section 41-6-79 (e).
....;\.t

Sinee the la-\v in question hnposed a duty upon the
plaintiff, it
her

a~

\Yalk of

i~

\Veil to examine the situation confronting

she emerged from the alley onto tl1e V{est side-

State Street on the day in question4 As she did

~o,

she 'va~ confronted 'vith the identical situation confronting a pedestrian on the south :.=ide of Second South
Street \\'·ho wjshes to cross to tl•e north in the middle of
"~ere

no streets
entering State Street fron1 the 'vest het.ween the inter~
~ection~ of :X orth Ten•ple and South rl'emple Streets
and the sidewalk, throughout that block, js unbroken
hy any intersection or enter.ing road,vay~ just as is the
the block. As to this plaintifft there

ease along the south side or Second South Street in the
l1eart of the business distriet.
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Clearly, tlterefo t·e, flt; to the plaintiff upon 'vhon1
this duty of care reHted, South Temple Street and North
r1\~1uple Street constituted ~'adjacent intersection~" a~
those \vords are used in the statute and it iH equally
elear~ there Pore, that ghe 'vas proh ihited by this la'v
front cros~ing the street at an}' point otl1er than in a
1narked

cros~"\\ralk.

The phra8e . ~adjacent intersection" has apparently
not been defined by this Court a11d our researeh .ha:-;
failed to reveal a definition l1y other· courts. ~J.lhe \Vord
~·adjacent" is defined hy \V PhRter~s New International
Die..tionary·, l~nabridged Second 1£dition (1957) as ;;'ly.i11g
near, close or contiguous; ne.lghboring; .... objects are
adjaeent when they lie close to eaeh other, but not neces8 ari ty in actual contact.''

As is conceded by plaintiff in .her brief, the "\\'ord
"'adjacent" is relative in meaning and its construction
should be determined by the context in vlhit.h it is used
in a statute.

rrhe Circuit Court of Appeals for tlte Fourth C~ir
euit, in Brotherhood lnv. On. v. Coal River n1i-ning Co.,
46 ~.,.2d 976, sets forth a nurnbcl' of Ineanings to the

word, as determined by the courts in various jurisdictions.. ()f interest to this case is the Circ.uit Court's

approval of the

follo~ing

language:
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'~ ..~.-\.djaeent does not Inc an

adj oini11g, 1Ju t in
the neigl1borhood of 7 or convenient, or near to the
spaec ~peeifiert"
Tf the pnrpo~t.~ of the f.;tatnt.e i~ kept in Inind, it is
ahnn d.antl y clear, under ordinary u~ages of the 1rvord
~~adjaeenl.,'~ that North Temple Kt.rcet. and South Temple
Street as tJ1e")' eru~sed State Street, "\Yf:re ~'"near to the
space specified" and \ver·e .:'eon venicnt't and they constia
t.uted ~'adjacent intr.rReetions'' jn 1'elation to plaintiff's
pu~ition before she attempted 1o cross the street.
lJ ndc r thi8 Ja.,\ plaintiff had thP .-.boice, a~ she
erncrgcd from the alle~y- onto the State Street. ~ide\va.P~
at a point directly 've~t of the end of Jl,!rs1 ~\venue, of
either "\va.lking ~outh to South Temple StrP:et and crossing
1rvith the protection of the traffic signal or of 'v alki ng
but a fe\v- steps to the north to the Ina1·ked pP(1f~1rirul
cro~s1valk indieated b~y ti1e Inap, Exhibit 1. She r.ho~e,
ho1~n~ver, not to avail herself of either of 01ese protected
areas and att.cn1ptcd to (·rn~s the !:1treet, in a driving
7

sno\v~torn•~

,

at a point

v,~l1ere

there \vas absolutelY no

1narking or indication of a cross\va1k 'vhich vlould give

her perntiHs1on to nse U1e street at that point

It 1-vas the vie\\r of the trial court, in the light of thet-;tatutes involved, that plaintiff
person~ <](_~signed

'\\-a8

in that class of

to be protected by the prohibition of
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Section 41-6-79 (c).. The fac.ts Vtrere not in dispute that
plaintif£1 in crossing the street, did not use the Inarked
pedestrian crosSVt alk and the court, theref oret ruled that
she violated the statute under discussion and that such
violation eonsti tnt ed negligence .
7

In this, the court was clearly. correct In f-l orth v.
Cartwright (l~tah, 1951), 229 P.2d 871, this Court~ in
speaking of another section of the traffic code, said:
"These statutes were promulgated for the
protection of the public and to safeguard property, life and limb of persons using the high\\ ays
from accidents of the type here involved. Vio1a~
tions of these statutes then, constitutes negligenee
7

in law..tt
The Court. the,n quoted 'vith approval the earlier
Utah case of White v~ Sh·ipley,.. 48 Utah 496, 160 P. 441:
"When a standard of duty or care is fixed by
law or ordinance, and such law or ordinance has
reference to the safety of life, limb, or property,
then, as a matter of necessity, a violation of such
law or ordinance constitutes negIigence. ''

It was,. and is, the view of the defendant that such
a ruling by the court rendered IDlnecessary any discussion of whether or not plaintiff was utilizing an ''un-
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n1arked cross·vl/alk at an inter~ection~' as tl1at tern1 is
util i?Jed in snb-Rer.tiou (a) of Section 41-6-79. The defend~
ant:t~ requests

for jury ir!~tr·ll.('tions (R . 95) '-\'ere sub-

lnitled on this theory. It

\11/aS,

and is, the vie\\' of the

def e11 dan t t.l• at the t\v o sub-s p.cti ons of thi~

statute clearly

r.ontP.ln plate different situation8 and that if one it:; involved the other neee8sarily cannot be. This is because
suh-seeti.on (e) prohibits crossing the street at all in

certain a.r e as

here as sub- ser.ti.on (a) a 1J o\Vs cr o~sing at

"\V

other areas but i1nposes a speelljic duty upon the pedef:l-

trian to yield t.he
street

~'ithout

rigl•t~of-v.ray

if he chooses to eros~ the

using a croRswalk.

the defendant that if it once be
deter1nine-d that an area is forbidden to pedestrian traf(ie, under sub-section (c), it is then ineonsistent and
·1 t \VOnld ~eem to

illogical to rille that a pedestrian is negligent. in using the
''forbidden area'' only if she fails

to yield the

right-of-

'vay to an onco·nl ing auto1nobile4
This~

ho \Veve r, was the position taken by the trial

b~y

its instruction No. 7 and the p1ain tiff~ having

court

been declared negligent under in8truction X o. 6, v-.,..as in
effect given a ne'v "1ease on life~' by instruction X o.

7,

1\1'"hich left to the jury the determination of her negligence or lack of it. It would appear, therefore, that if
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the court was in error in this regard, the error was certainly harmless to the plain tiff and, in fact, aided her
cause.

·rhe language of Section 41.-6-79 (c) is clear and
definite in its meaning. The history of the statute shovls
that it was conceived for the protection of all \vho use
our heavily traveled street~. Under such circumstances,
the Court should apply the familiar rule it approved in
E1)a-n.s v. R-eiser ( LT tah, 1931), 78 Utah 253, 2 P .2d 615 :
''Where the language of a statute is plain
and conveys a definite and sensible meaning, the
court must enforee it according to the obvious
rneaning of the words employed ~ .. "
4

••

Under all the circumstances, the trial court correct Iy
ruled that plaintiff, in at tern pting to cross the street
bet\veen adjac.ent intersections where traffic eontrol sig-

nals were in operation, was negligent as a matter of la'v
in failing to use a marked crosswalk.
POINT II
ANY ERROR WHICH THE TRIAL COURT MAY HAVE

COMMITTED WAS HAR11LESS AND NOT PREJUDICIAL
SJNCE PLAINTIFFt BECAUSE OF HER NEGLIGENCE~ WAS
NOT ENTITLED TO A VERDICT IN ANY EVENT.
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Before plaintiff is entitled to a reversal of this
j Lidgrncnt, she must carlJ'~ the hurd en of eo11 vi ncing this
Conrt that error 'vas conunittcd, that the error 1''acl
p1·c j udieial and that it adve rs Pl~y- affected her substantial
rights. Rule 61, 1Jtah Rule~ of (;ivil Proeedure.
J 1. is a1sn ineulnbent upon p1aint.iff to sho\\', as she
geeks a reversal, that ~tthere is at least a fair likelihood
t.hat the result "'ould l1ave been different" in the trial
ronrt, except for the erl'ors she clahns or~,urred. Starf.in.
v. J.lladswn (1951), 12.0 ·ctah 631, 2:j7 P.2d 8:34; Joseph v .
1T7 .. H. Groves Latter~Day Sai~nts Hospital [. Ct.ah, 1957) ~
;318 p ~2d 330.

l)e rend ant. r..on tendR that plaintiff has completely
failed to fulfill the requirement~ demanded by the R.uJe
and the decisions cited. The record, in ~tead, reveals this
to be a ease sjtnilar in effect to Butler v. Payne, 58

l~tah

383, 203 P . 869, dec.ided nearly 40 years ago.

In that case,

t.h.i~

Court concluded its discussion of

a \Vr ongful death ac1:ion, in \vbich plaj ntiff harl appealed
rl'Oln

an adverse verdict, in the follov.ing language:

''No matter "\vhat the tria] court did or said,
or -failed to do or say, .it cannot alter or change
the physical conditions whicl1 irresistibly compel
the c-onclusion that plaint.Jff's intestate did not
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exercise reasonable care for his own safety~ and
that his own carelessness was the proxhnate cause
of the accident which resulted in his dP.ath. Th~
trial court ought to have granted the motion for
a directed verdict.. If the jury had found in favor
of the plaintiff,. it would have been our duty, as
a matter of la,v, to set the verdict aside and
reverse the judgment.~'
·under the guidance of this principle and upon application of the law governing the rights and duties of
pedestrians in crossing the street8~ the record 1n this
case conclusively reveals that plain tiff \vas gu i 1ty of contributory negligence vlhich bars her fro1n recovery regardless of whether the statute previously discussed
'w·as properly applied by the trial eourt.
The jury reasonably could have inferred from the
evidence that as plaintiff stepped fro1n the west curb of
State Street~ the defendant's autornobile o,vas then in
the process of turning into the center lane for south~
bound traffic on State Street The car v.ras there to be
seen and it was obvious that if she continued, she would
be !n danger.. N everthelesst she continued.. Thus, plaintiff is impaled upon the horns of the familiar dilemma

that she either looked and failed to heed Vt hat st1 e sa'v
or that she did not look and eontinued across the street
oblivious to the danger and to the impending accident.
1
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Jfrom the uncontradicted evidence, plaintiff did not
look. She 'vallred straight ahead, "\vit.hout turning ber
head and carrying an object over head to shield her face
from the wet snov{ 'vhich 'vas tailing.
A. t a.nJr time from the time she Vt'aB 3 or 4 feet into
the street, she could have avoided this accident merely
hy stopping or reducing her paee to a suffieient extent
to allo\v the automobile to go by.

Sin cc she \vas not

looking she "\vas unable to use even the slightest physical

effort to avoid harm to herselfr
Even if the defendant should be said to have been
11egllgent~

.it is apparent from the

jury~s

verdict that it

found he had no clear opportunity to avoid this accident.
It \\"ill he recalled tl1at the court instructed the jury to
av~'ard

a vcrdiet to plaintiff if it deterruincd that.· the

defendant had the last clear chance to avoid this accident.
oin(·c~

the sympathies of the jury obviously rested upon

this spry and attractive little lady, it is apparent that
even under the humanitarian doctrine of last clear

chance, tJLe jury could find no ,,~ay to aid her .
Plaintiff cannot escape the f-orce of the decision of

this Court in JJ.£ngus v. Olsson (l;tah, 1949), 201. P.2d
495, lJ it Utah 505. In tl1at case thls Court held:
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"l\iore convincing than the direct testimony
that deceased did not look, is the further evidence
that deceased neither f.;aid nor did anything to
indiea te that he 'vas at a] l a\vare of the danger
presented by defendant's approac.hing automobile~
He seems to have been 1vholly una.,vare of its
a pproac.h. Certainly he did not. hi ng either to
\varn his ''rife, nor t.o rescue either him~ elf nor
her front their position of peril.. On this evidence,
it must be ~aid as a matter of la"Y\ that deceased
either failed to look~ or having looked, fajlerl to
see what he ~hould have seen~"
7

~' ......

A pedestrian crossing a public street in
a crosf·n.valk or pedestrian lane, although he rnay
have the right of "'.. a y over vehi.cula r traffic, nonetheless has tlte duty to observe for such traffic .
Clearly, decedent neglected that duty in this case.
It follo1\'S that he 'vas contributorily negligent
as a matter of law. Of course, \Ve do not mean
to imply tltat a mere glanc.e in tta~~ direction of
the approaching automobile \vould suffice.. The
duty to look has inherent in it the duty to see
'"'hat is there to be seen, and to pay heed to it.''

Plaintiff "ras struck near the point designat-ed by the
horizontal letter ~~pj' on Exhibit 1. She \vas in the center
lane for southbonnd traffic, about 14 feet cast of the

curb from which she had stepped. At any time before

she crossed the first southbormd traffic lane, she could
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have stopped or slowed and this accident \\'ould not have
oc.curred.. She did not need the agility of an athlete, as
she llO\'{ c-ornplains in her brief.
She did not stop nor did she he~itate. Instead, she
eontinued her n1ea~ured pace, neither increasing it nor
dP.Pr~~a~ i ng It and never once looked or gave any other
.indication that she \VaR avrare that any other person or
thing might be on the street she "\Vas attcntpting to cros;'3.
l~nder ~uch

circurnstanecs, plaintiff'~ eonduct falls.
squarely "\vithin the doctrine of :'!1:n.tros v~ Olsson, and the
effect of that deci~ion ear11~ot be i.utpaired Ol' reduc.ed by
resort to vivid quotation~ from an unidentified "'Personal Injury ::.\e"\v~letter,'' as iP. attempted jn plaintiff~s
briPf~ 1\i.th its excerpt~ rrom t \VO recent Jl ir..higan r.ases.

Eac-h of the .&.·1 irlligan caRes ~'as decided in favor of
the plainti i"i" but neither preRented facts even remotely
~~l~J llar to those 'vith 1..vhich \Ve are concerned in the
present easer
-~.,or
(~Iich.,

example, in the e.ited case of Bartlett v. l.l.lelzo
1958), SS N."l\r.2d 518, tlu_~ decedent had crossed

a "\\Tide street and had his foot upon the

r.:u rb

of the other

side 'vhen he 'vas struck by one of t.,ro automobiles
engaging in a

~~drag

race" fron1 a traffic light one city

block R\vay. When the decedent had started to cross th~~
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street., the traffic light had not changed and yet b~y the
time his foot had reached the opposite curb the racing
autoinobiles had traversed the ei(r block and one of
thein r.ut over into the curb area and struck him.

Defendant prefers to rest his case upon controlling
dec.is ions of similar cases in this ju ri~dietion, rather than
upon decisions of dissimilar cases by the court of a midv.restern state.
In 1'1ingus v. Ol~su-n, the Court, for purposes of the
appeal, a8sumed that the pedestrian involved had been

in a cro sswa1k and \vas, there£ ore, afforded the p rotection given to pedestrians in such araas. Ho,vever, i.rt

the ease at bar, the jury had ample reason to i.nfer fron1
the physical evidence and the testimony of the police
officer that plaintiff 'vas 1\,.allring diagonally across the
street to reach her hotne and 1vas outside the area

eu~

compassed bet,veen an extension of the side,valk lines
on the south side of First Avenue. Tt is true the court
instructed the jury she was not 'Nithin an "unmarked

crosswalk at an intersection" as that ter1n i8 used in

the statutes. The point is, hov,tcver, that even if the
court had not so instructed the jury, the jury could have
found, from the evidence and inferences in the record,
that pJaintiff was not in an area in 1vhich she received
the protection of the law.
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CndGr such a finding, plaintiff would be barred from
rPeovcry beeause of the j1nplications of the rule in Sant
v. JJf.i:llfr ( lJtah, 1949) 206 P.2d 719, in \vhich the ·Court

held:
"'A greater degree of care is necessary upon
the part of a pedestrian \Vho undertakes to cross
a cit)' st teet at a p1·ohibited place than is plaeed
on one \vho uses a marked eross-.valk''
In an effort to avoid thiR posRibility, plaintiff's brief
argues that clefendant "'\\,..as familiar with the intersection
and presumably knew that a custom existed to use that
area of the street as a cro~ sing plaee for pedestrians.
In support of this theory, plaintiff cites a Louisiana caEe
and a Pennsylvania caE:e decided in 1915.
TI1e Louisiana case can s j!.arc.ely be called aut ho rita ti ve, in vieVt' of the unusual, canonical laws o£ that
juris diction .
-~L,he

Pennsylvania case proves to involve an instance
in \vhich the autoinobile driver violated a la-\v by passing
a tearr1 of horses and a \vagon on the 'vrong s.ide.. Fur~
t.her~ the dece?-sed pedestrian had been '-\1allring on ~ . crossing stones'' \vhifJh had been laid from the curb to streetear tracks in the center of the street.. Persons intending
to board streetcars used the crossing stones

to reach the

track and both the trac.k and the row of stones \vere
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notice to a driver that IJede~trians crossed there. TJnder
such circumstances, the Pennsylvania court properly held
that the decedent's contributory negligence "'~as a jury
question, instead of a matter of la"\\"~" for the court to
decide.
Defendant believes the 'veight of authority and the
better reasoned cases on t.his point are exe1nplified hy
the recent decision of the l~ourt of _._~ppeals of Mary~
land in the ease of Jlenderson v . Brown (~fd., 1957):t 135

A.2d

~Sl.

In that case a pedestrian "\\ as injured by a
7

taxicab and the evidence revealed that many sailors in
the eity of Port

Depo~it

r:r·ossed the ;;.treet at the point

where tlte accident occurred"

1\~hich

fact was kn nwn to

the defendant eab driverr
f"l,he pedestrian urged that such use by the sailors

and it was contended that the defendant should be held to have expected

had established ''an informal

eross~~alk"

pedestrians in that area .

The Maryland court rejected this contention and
noted that there \vere officially n1arked eross,valks
•'

~·

'~near

by.'' But the court said that even if there had not been,

•'

their a bsenee would not entitle pedestrians ". . . by
custom or habit to establish a cross-\valk which then gives
them the

right-of~way . ''
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So~ 1n this

ease1 plaintiff'~ .ns~ertion that. ''every~
body goes a eros~ there/~ even if eou pled \vit1• dPfendant'8
~ta tenl' ~n t that he had ~(~Cll ~'people . . ~ jay1valking
l here'~ canr1ot ~erv~e to change the \Vrittcn la·w·~ ,v·hlch
\Vfl.~ pa~t:1ed

for the protection of all "\vho use our streets.
CONCL LJSIO~

The trial eonrt interpreted tl1e prineipal 8tatute
i rl v o1 'led in this ea~e, Seetion 41 -6-"79 (e), in the only
logi('nl and teasonable 'vay, ~o tllat thoHe persons who
tno~t. g-reatly needed protccti.OTl f.ron1 1nodern traffic the l)Cdcsteian~ ~- eould find easily aeccssible and safe
a eca~ in 'vhieh to t r,o~s he av il.Y travel cd st. r<..~et.~. .A contrary interprctati..on \vould destroy the obviou~ purpose
and intent of the statute and \Vfluld render nv:aningless

thP protee.tion it \Vas designed to provide4

It i6 so"Inc·v,rhat paradoxical that tills intPrpretatlon~
hich gives rnaxiinurn effect to the la,\·, should be so
vigorously attaekcd by thi~ S.:J. --:;~ear old plaintiff who~
perhaps n1ore than all other·s~ needs its protection the

7
"\\

1nost.

N owhcrc in her brief does the plaintiff present any
argument or authority in opposition

to the trial.courl's

construction of this statute and of the v?ords ''"between

adjacent

intersections~'

as they are used in the context
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Df this la1v. After conceding that the '\Vord "adJacent"
is relative in its

meaning~

plaintifr is content to rest her

argurnent upon the citation of

tvt.~o ca.se8

from OklahonHl

and in each of these, the court was concerned 'vith the
use of that v""ord as it is found in Oklahouta statutes
relating to acquisition or annexation of lands b-:,r school
district:;; or cities~
Plaintiff, 'vho ignored the protect1on of a marked
c.rosswalk, who blindly

V~-7 alked

through a sno\vstorm

across a busy street without looking or

otherv,~ise

pro-

tecting herself,. bas demonstrated conclusively that she
is not entitled to recover, that the verdict was correct

and that the judgment should be affirn1ed~
Respectfn ll~y submitted,
SKEEN, WORSLEY, SNOW & CHRISTENSEN
and JOHN

H~

SNOW

A tt0"1"n.ey 8 for Defendant a-nd Respondent.

701 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake

City~

Utah
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